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Cisco Foundry Security Spec

Subject kind: domain-specific specification / architecture seed
Workload: authorized AI-assisted software-security evaluation with source access
Reviewed: September 30, 2026
Repository revision: c770bf7764265dda188d9a270b1105a4bb62759b
Seed specification: 0.1.0
Constitution: 0.2.0

Primary sources:

Foundry is deliberately not executable code. Cisco describes it as an organization-neutral seed specification distilled from internal security-evaluation systems.

It shows where a prescriptive architecture can be appropriate when the workload boundary is explicit.

The seed assumes an operator is authorized to evaluate software and has source access, with an optional running testbed.

Foundry explicitly flags black-box-only testing, unauthorized/external targets, or non-security code review as cases where core assumptions change.

Its prescriptions should therefore be interpreted inside that workload boundary, not promoted into universal Harness requirements.

The seed defines eight core roles: Orchestrator, Indexer, Cartographer, Detector, Triager, Validator, Reporter, and Coverage Guide, plus optional extension roles.

Those roles depend on a non-agent substrate with a work queue, finding store, sandbox, budget tracking, and operational state.

Foundry is therefore not just “many agents talking.” Deterministic shared infrastructure carries work ownership, findings, liveness, budgets, and isolation.

Its constitution makes Evidence Over Assertion a core principle: confidence is not a finding verdict.

The architecture separates detection, triage, validation, reporting, deduplication, and evidence gates.

Foundry defines “done” for an evaluation as both:

  • stated coverage being credibly attempted; and
  • finding yield decaying below an operator-set threshold.

That condition is meaningful for this security-evaluation workload, not a universal agent completion rule.

Atomic claims and heartbeat-based liveness support shared-state workers and crash recovery. The constitution also requires runtime-enforced sandbox boundaries rather than prompt-only isolation and ranks operator instruction above agent-authored conclusions.

These are requirements of a Foundry-derived architecture; they are not evidence that a chosen underlying coding Harness provides them.

No reviewed evidence establishes that Antares CLI implements Foundry or that Foundry requires Antares.

  • Antares provides specialized model/CLI behavior for vulnerability localization.
  • Foundry describes a broader security-evaluation architecture and lifecycle.

This is source inspection of the public specification repository. Harness Operations did not build a Foundry-derived system or independently reproduce Cisco’s internal production experience.